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The main goal of the paper is to obtain quantitative evidence describing determinants of FDI in
the case of the Czech economy in order to empirically support the decision-making process
within the Czech National Bank. The paper builds on the recent economic literature and at the
same time examines FDI inflows from the perspective of a multinational company.
Furthermore, the microeconomic and macroeconomic characteristics of a potential host country
which are crucial for multinational companies’ investment decisions are examined. Since
government investment incentives seem to play a role in attracting foreign direct investors the
paper provides some details on the Czech economic environment regarding this issue. To reach
those objectives a cointegration analysis and error-correction model is used to identify the most
important determinants of FDI inflows in the Czech Republic by developing an econometric
model for analytic purposes. The empirical results presented in the paper support the hypothesis
that the most significant determinants of FDI inflow into the Czech economy correspond to the
theoretically considered and empirically tested factors. The paper, therefore, provides some
basis for analysing the character of foreign investment and assessing the role of the government
in attracting FDI inflows to the Czech Republic. More specifically, the empirical results suggest
that establishing and maintaining macroeconomic stability and external equilibrium, offering a
consistent and competitive package of investment incentives and promotion, and an efficient
financing infrastructure, public governance regime and social system are the key factors
promoting foreign direct investment inflows.
JEL Codes: F21, F23, C22.
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Nontechnical Summary
Foreign direct investment has played an important role in the transition process and economic
development of the Czech Republic. Understanding all the relations and implications of inward
FDI from a qualitative and quantitative point of view is crucial for the design of well-founded
monetary policy decisions. Thus, the main objective of this paper is to deepen our knowledge and
experience in the field of open-economy macroeconomics related to foreign direct investment.
The ultimate goal of the project is to obtain quantitative evidence in terms of econometric results
describing the determinants of FDI in the case of the Czech economy in order to empirically
support the decision-making process within the Czech National Bank.
In order to do that, the paper examines the theoretical and empirical literature to identify possible
factors explaining the behaviour of foreign direct investment in the Czech case over the last
decade. An exploration of the motivation to invest abroad from the perspective of a multinational
company is the starting point of the analysis. Furthermore, the microeconomic and
macroeconomic characteristics of a potential host country which are crucial for multinational
companies’ investment decisions are examined. Since government investment incentives seem to
play a role in attracting foreign direct investors, the paper provides some details on the Czech
economic environment regarding this issue. To obtain specific empirical results, cointegration
analysis and an error-correction model are used to identify the most important determinants of
FDI inflows into the Czech Republic. The final econometric results are used for analytical
interpretation of past FDI development and for drawing up some policy recommendations for the
future.
The conclusions presented in the paper suggest that inward FDI coming to the Czech Republic has
been prevailingly of a vertical (export-oriented) character. Accordingly, multinational companies
have considered the Czech Republic as a potential destination for their foreign affiliates, focusing
on its comparative (dis)advantage in terms of input prices, government promotion of FDI and
economic vulnerability. Based on this, the recommendation for the government if it wishes to
accelerate the FDI inflow is to establish and maintain overall macroeconomic stability and
external equilibrium. From the government’s point of view, a consistent and competitive package
of investment incentives is another effective means of promoting inward FDI, according to the
results of the paper. A high-quality infrastructure, well-functioning public governance, an efficient
legal and regulatory framework, and social cohesion are also necessary preconditions for any
country to successfully compete for inward FDI, as suggested by the Czech evidence provided in
the paper.Identification and Measurement of Relationships Concerning Inflow of FDI   3
1. Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has played an important role in the transition process and
economic development of the Czech Republic.
1 For example, from the monetary policy
perspective, the behaviour of inward FDI and its influence on the foreign exchange market and the
balance of payments (BOP) have to be taken into account. In other words, assessing the short-run
impact of inward FDI on the volatility of the various components of domestic demand and the
near-term response of economic activity to the inflow of FDI is important for the monetary
authorities in the process of stabilising the economy by means of MP instruments. Finally, an
understanding of the implications of the long-run supply side effects of inward FDI on the
potential or non-accelerating inflation product (or rate of unemployment) from a qualitative and
quantitative point of view is crucial for the design of well-founded monetary policy decisions.
Thus, the main objective of this paper is to deepen our knowledge and experience in the field of
open-economy macroeconomics related to foreign direct investment. The ultimate goal of the
project is to obtain quantitative evidence in terms of econometric estimation results describing the
determinants of FDI in the case of the Czech economy.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 considers some underlying theory and the main
determinants of FDI flows throughout the world. Section 3 provides an empirical analysis of the
determinants of FDI inflow into the Czech economy, consisting of formulating the basic
hypotheses, describing the data used, specifying the econometric methodology, and estimating the
equations. The final section summarises the empirical results and provides overall conclusions
and implications.
2. Determinants of Inward FDI – Underlying Theory
The theory of worldwide FDI flows tries to resolve two types of issues. First, it examines the
reasons and incentives that motivate companies to invest abroad and shift their production to a
foreign country.
2 Second, it explores relevant microeconomic and macroeconomic characteristics
of a potential host country that might play a key role for multinational companies (MNCs) when
making a choice among suitable locations for a foreign subsidiary or branch. As we will argue
                                          
1 Generally, FDI reflects the objective of a resident entity in one economy to obtain a lasting interest in an
enterprise resident in another economy. In line with international standards (IMF/OECD) a “10% ownership
criterion” should be applied to infer the existence of a lasting interest. The components of direct investment
transactions are equity capital, reinvested earnings and other capital associated with various inter-company debt
transactions [ECB, 2002].
2 In this respect we should define all the possible ways through which inflow of FDI may happen. Firstly, there
are mergers and acquisitions directly connected with privatisation processes, taking place mainly in the former
centrally planned CEE economies. Secondly, there are private mergers and acquisitions, defined as a change of
assets from domestic to foreign entities, in the form of selling shares to a new foreign owner or using other
financial schemes to create new firms, e.g. “joint ventures”, or subsidiaries and branches. Such activities, at least
initially, do not all usually add to the productive capacity of the recipient economies. And thirdly, only a part of
those newly created firms (JVs and affiliates) arise via the building of new production capacities in an open area
(“greenfield projects”) or via the installation of new technology in existing premises (“brownfield projects”).4   Petr Král
later in the text, government investment incentives and promotion may play a specific role in the
competition among countries to attract inward FDI.
2.1 General Theory of a Multinational Company and Distinguishing Types of FDI
Activities
There are two main reasons for FDI activities. The first is to compete on a local market in a
foreign country more successfully, and the second is to gain cheaper inputs. The literature
covering this topic concludes that multinational companies arise “from a combination of industrial
organisation motives that result in a number of activities being placed under common ownership
and control, and comparative advantage reasons that cause these activities to be placed in separate
countries” [Holland, Pain 1998, p. 1]. The motives of industrial organisations are closely related
to internalisation theory and transaction costs in the development of foreign operations. A
multinational company can select one of three possible ways to co-ordinate economic agents
spread out worldwide, i.e. by means of internalisation of transactions within a single institution,
via establishing an international firm.
3 Thus, the multinational company is established as a
response to market failures, as a way to increase allocative efficiency in the presence of high costs
of co-ordinating economic activity between independent economic agents [Blomström, Kokko,
2003].
As stated in [Lim, 2001], three main conditions must be fulfilled for a firm to conduct FDI
activities successfully. First, the firm must be the owner of a “firm-specific knowledge-based
tangible or intangible asset”. This allows the firm to beat other firms (ownership advantage),
otherwise it would not be able to overcome the additional costs associated with producing in a
foreign country. Second, from the firm’s point of view, using such an asset is more advantageous
than selling or leasing it (internalisation). Third, using such an asset is more beneficial when
combined with at least some factor inputs located in a foreign country (location advantage).
According to the prevailing motivation for a company to become multinational, we can
distinguish two basic types of FDI activities [see, for example, Slaughter, 2002]. The first type,
denoting FDI designed to serve local markets, is often called “horizontal” or “market-seeking” or
“tariff-hopping” FDI. This means creating similar capacities in a foreign country in order to
supply the local market, with the aim of decreasing the costs associated with supplying the market
from abroad (e.g. to avoid tariffs and transport costs). The other reason for horizontal FDI is the
effort of an MNC to become more competitive through geographical and non-geographical
proximity to the local market and by means of better understanding of local preferences,
conditions, etc. As such, “horizontal FDI will tend to replace exports from the home market of the
MNC if the costs of market access through exports (tariffs and transport costs) are higher than the
net costs of setting up a local plant and doing business in a foreign environment” [Lim, 2001, p.
11].
                                          
3 The two remaining ways are (i) decentralised decision-making and transactions using the price mechanism and
(ii) contractual agreements. However, the price mechanism has costs that may (if the contracted commodity is
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The second type of FDI, often referred to as “vertical” or “production-costs minimising” FDI,
consists in slicing the vertical division of the technological process and removing part of the
procedures to a low-cost country in order to gain cheaper factor inputs.
4 The inexpensive inputs
may be primary commodities or raw materials, or the project may seek other types of inputs, such
as labour, human capital, intermediate goods, or access to certain externalities.
Vertical FDI tends to be export-oriented, frequently to the home market of the MNC making this
FDI. And, consequently, this type of FDI does not seem to be influenced by the recipient
country’s market size.
There is a phenomenon referred to as the “clustering” or “agglomeration effect” which horizontal
and vertical FDI have in common. This means that FDI may show a tendency to cluster in a
particular locality because of linkages among projects creating incentives for a subsidiary or
branch of an MNC to be established in the vicinity of other firms. Moreover, clusters may arise if
firms exhibit “herd behaviour”, with some of them applying the “follow-the-leader” strategy and
waiting for the successful results of the first FDI-related firms to confirm a good investment
climate and general conditions in the host country.
2.2 Microeconomic and Macroeconomic Characteristics of the Host Country
After the decision to set up a subsidiary or branch in a foreign country has been made, the
company seeks a suitable location for its investment. The specific type of FDI activity
substantially affects this key process. Thus, the power of each particular microeconomic and
macroeconomic characteristic may sometimes differ depending on what type of FDI the country is
going to receive [Lim, 2001].
Generally speaking, it is obvious that the strength of FDI inflow and the FDI stock resulting from
it in a given country is positively related to factors such as overall political stability and the ability
of the host country to protect human and property rights. Beyond these, there are several other
specific factors affecting the decision of the MNC. Some of these will be the subject of the
empirical examination regarding the Czech Republic in section 3 of this paper.
•  Host country market size: As one would expect, horizontal FDI seems to be affected by this
factor to a substantial extent. Conversely, vertical FDI is indifferent to the size of the country
(due to its export orientation). The possible influence of the market size of the Czech economy
measured in terms of GDP, along with other factors, will be examined in the empirical section
of this paper in order to reveal the prevailing pattern of the inward FDI in the Czech Republic.
•  Clustering effects: Both horizontal and vertical FDI seem to be positively influenced by these
effects. The key factors that may contribute to agglomeration effects are the following:
−  the infrastructure of the host country;
−  the extent of industrialisation;
−  the volume of the existing FDI stock.
                                          
4 This strict dichotomy concerning the two types of FDI activities is, of course, only of a theoretical pattern. In
reality, these types are not mutually exclusive within one single project.6   Petr Král
The last-mentioned will be used in the empirical exploration below to decide whether
incoming FDI is affected by these clustering effects in the Czech Republic as well.
•  Factor costs (especially labour and human capital costs): As stated above, vertical FDI
searches for low-cost locations to establish new production facilities. However, not only price,
but also the quality, availability and productivity of production factors in each country have to
be taken into account. The international competitiveness of the Czech Republic in terms of
factor costs (unit labour costs) and their influence on FDI inflow will also be the subject of
econometric analysis in the empirical part of this paper.
•  Government investment incentives and promotion: The next subsection will be dedicated
solely to this factor in detail.
•  Riskiness and macroeconomic stability: The location of FDI is affected by risk perceptions.
A stable political and macroeconomic environment is one of the most important preconditions
for any country that desires to become a location for a foreign subsidiary of an MNC.
However, it is difficult to measure risk perception, especially if there is a need for time-
varying figures for statistical evaluation. At the macroeconomic level there are several widely
used indicators that can be employed – exchange rate stability, inflation and its volatility, and
measures of external stability such as debt/GDP ratio or CA/GDP ratio. The last-mentioned
variable will be used in the empirical analyses for the Czech Republic.
•  State interference in the economy: A prohibitively high tax burden, large subsidies and a
high share of state-owned enterprises are perceived very negatively by foreign investors, as
they increase uncertainty and inequalities in the host country market. On the contrary,
providing and maintaining social cohesion, a high quality infrastructure and efficient public
governance via public expenditure may be a relevant factor in attracting inward FDI.
Therefore, the effects of the public activities of the Czech government on FDI inflow will be
explored in this study as well.
•  Transport costs and economic distance: In the case of horizontal FDI, this factor is of great
relevance, as high transport costs and large economic distance may encourage horizontal FDI
to avoid additional export-related costs. Conversely, an outlying country does not tend to be a
suitable location for the vertical type of FDI because of its export orientation and worldwide
interoperability. Because of its relevance for cross-sectional analysis only, the distance of the
Czech Republic from its FDI home countries will not be examined in the econometric analysis
later on. The remaining theoretically relevant factors below will not be included in the
empirical exploration either, owing to a lack of reliable data suitable for statistical procedures
in the case of the Czech Republic.
•  Privatisation: Especially in transition countries, the privatisation process undertaken by their
governments has been a strong incentive for strategic FDI. This act is understood by
worldwide investors as a signal of commitment to private ownership, and it simultaneously
provides governments with some control over the direction, volume and timing of capital
movements [Holland, Pain, 1998]. Unfortunately, we do not have precise data on
privatisation-related FDI in the required quality and frequency to explore the influence of this
factor in the case of the Czech Republic.
5
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•  Business/investment climate: Effective protection of property rights, easy enforceability of
contracts, transparent and adequate labour regulations, and small regulatory, bureaucratic and
judicial hurdles seem to attract both vertical and horizontal FDI. On the contrary, local content
requirements, mandatory joint venture partnerships, and obstacles to transferring profits
abroad would make a potential country less attractive for both types of FDI [Lim, 2001].
•  Trade barriers/openness: “Investors prefer countries with relatively liberal trade regimes,
possibly within regions with wider supra-national free trade agreements” [Holland, Pain,
1998, p. 9]. This is presumably the case with vertical FDIs, which are basically dependent on
substantial flows of inputs across the borders of the host country. As a consequence, investors
prefer a liberal and predictable trade regime. However, there are views claiming that
horizontal FDI designed to overcome trade barriers (“tariff-hopping”) may be negatively
influenced by an increase in openness [Lim, 2001].
•  Regional integration: A purely theoretical, rather stationary approach based on the prevailing
motivation for horizontal and/or vertical FDI activities claims that regional integration leads to
a decrease in intra-regional horizontal FDI flows, whereas vertical FDI within the region may
be encouraged by this fact. As regards inter-regional FDI, both vertical and horizontal inward
investment seems to be attracted by a higher degree of regional integration. Besides that, there
are several additional dynamic effects of regional integration that are rather time-consuming.
Nevertheless, they also in the end lead to a more massive FDI inflow into countries that
participate in the integration process. However, there mixed results and opinions about the
possible positive effects of the EU accession of the CEE countries on their inward FDI.
[Barry, 2002], for example, demonstrates by means of the favourable Irish experience that
CEE countries may expect a rapid increase in FDI inflow after EU accession and enjoy
subsequent positive structural and technological changes leading to fast catching-up effects.
6
On the contrary, [Görg, Greenaway, 2002] using their results based on gravity modelling
claim that CEE countries cannot expect substantial growth of FDI inflow from the UK into
their manufacturing industries after their EU accession, and only slight growth of inward FDI
in services.
As regards the Czech Republic, our view regarding inward FDI after EU accession is
somewhere between these two poles. We cannot expect such a dramatic positive change in
foreign investors’ perception of our country as that experienced by Ireland, as the Irish
economy enjoyed extraordinarily favourable circumstances.
7 On the other hand, although the
investment community has been expecting our EU entry for several years, the existing scheme
of a free trade agreement and association treaty is not considered to be equivalent to full EU
accession with adoption of the acquis communautaire and the Single Market Programme
rules. Therefore, there is, in our opinion, some space for a rather stronger FDI inflow after the
                                          
6 Moreover, “EU membership today is a much stronger guarantee of a transparent legal and business
environment than it was at the time of Ireland’s EU entry because of the development of the legal and
institutional framework of the EU, the acquis communautaire” [Barry, 2002, p. 10].
7 It is accepted that a combination of an English-language environment, a very efficient agency promoting FDI
inflow, a high number of managers of U.S. companies of Irish origin and an orientation on R&D and a
knowledge-based economy contributed to the very strong acceleration of FDI inflow in the Irish case after its EU
accession.8   Petr Král
Czech Republic becomes an EU member than that which we have observed in recent years.
However, the Irish experience will be hard to follow.
•  Law and order, legal and regulatory framework and efficient public governance: The
influence of this factor is obvious.
•  Proximity to potential FDI source countries: Foreign investors prefer to establish their new
affiliates in countries that are similar to their own home country. For example, the English-
language environment in Ireland is classified as the third most important factor underlying
Ireland’s success in the field of FDI inflow, after its well-educated labour force and
advantageous corporate income tax rate [Barry, 2002].
2.3 Government Investment Incentives and Promotion
As stated above, government investment incentives and promotion (GIIP) are among the most
important characteristics of a potential host country and occupy a special position among them.
However, until recently, investment incentives were considered a relatively peripheral
determinant of FDI, which was prevailingly regarded as horizontal FDI. For this reason, basic
economic fundamentals such as market size, income and trade policies, infrastructure, etc. were
recognised to be of greatest relevance to an MNC establishing a new foreign facility to serve a
local market.
However, this opinion has been changing in recent years. This turning point can be derived from
the fact that GIIP have spread massively since the mid-1990s. Consequently, very strong
competition among countries in the field of GIIP has emerged in the last decade. Moreover,
unilateral abolition of GIIP is considered to have significant costs in terms of positive spillovers
because of the lasting impacts of initial FDI inflow on further FDI through
agglomeration/clustering effects [Pain, 2002].
Surprisingly, GIIP are more common in developed countries than in developing ones and their
increasing importance for decision-making is documented both by MNC executives in surveys
and by econometric studies, particularly in the case of fiscal preferences [Blomström, Kokko,
2003]. The reason lies in the internalisation of the world economy. This leads to the fact that
smaller economies are now allowed to compete for FDI that previously went automatically to the
big markets.
It is hard to quantify whether GIIP yield benefits larger than costs because of the time lag between
the moment of granting GIIP and the future period of reaping the benefits from FDI activities and
the ensuing processes (if there are any), let alone the case where the investor is footloose and can
easily move on to other destinations offering even more advantageous GIIP before the expected
gains in the former location have occurred.
Generally, GIIP are justified if MNCs differ from local firms by having firm-specific knowledge-
based assets and if there are productivity spillovers to local firms. Then GIIP can bridge the gap
between social and private return, avoiding a scenario where FDI would drop below its social-
optimal level if the GIIP were not offered. On the other hand, there should be no GIIP for firmsIdentification and Measurement of Relationships Concerning Inflow of FDI   9
that do not own any specific assets, since such firms’ incentive to invest is purely linked to GIIP
(otherwise these enterprises would not be able to compete with domestic firms).
8
In this context, the best policy to follow is probably to design the GIIP so as to induce positive
externalities and hence improve the ability of local firms to learn and absorb foreign technologies
and skills. GIIP should be considered as a part of a policy that promotes innovation and growth of
the overall economy rather than a policy instrument that is available only to foreign investors.
However, good fundamentals are by far the best incentive and attraction for FDI. From this point
of view, explicit GIIP are sometimes denoted as a second-best policy for governments that are
unable to offer good fundamentals to foreign investors [Jahn, Zigic, 2001].
There are three main categories of government investment incentives and promotion – see, for
example, [Pain, 2002]. The first is tax incentives, including preferential tax rates and capital
allowances. They determine the post-tax returns of FDI projects even if production costs are
equalised across countries. On the other hand, the tax rate in a particular recipient country might
not be of great relevance where “transfer pricing” by MNCs is possible. Tax incentives are also
considered by international investors to be a relatively temporary and easily removable policy.
Financial incentives are also one of the elements of GIIP. They include factors such as
government grants and subsidies, loan guarantees, preferential loans, and government equity
participation in high-risk investments.
The last category of GIIP, namely non-financial measures, includes the provision of subsidised
infrastructure such as prepared industrial areas, free-trade zones and preferential government
contracts (offset programs, etc.) [Pain, 2002].
As regards the influence of government investment incentives and promotion schemes on the
particular types of FDI (horizontal vs. vertical), it is commonly accepted that these arrangements
can increase the country’s comparative advantage for both types of FDI. However, vertical (cost-
minimising) FDI is more focused on cost differentials across countries and thus considered to be a
kind of “globetrotter”. Therefore, it seems more sensitive to investment incentives.
The situation in the field of government investment incentives and promotion in the case of the
Czech Republic is described in Appendix 2.
3. Empirical Analysis of Determinants of Inward FDI in the Czech Economy
This section is devoted to the presentation of econometric estimation results aimed at identifying
the main determinants of inward FDI in the last decade in the Czech Republic. Standard
microeconomic and macroeconomic factors consistent with the underlying theory will be used for
the choice of explanatory variables. Based on these estimated equations, conclusions will be
                                          
8 Notwithstanding the situation where a government attracts FDI by means of GIIP at a time when
unemployment, insufficient investment and weak growth are a central policy problem.10   Petr Král
drawn about the factors that may have played an important role in attracting FDI in recent years in
the Czech Republic. The other goal of the empirical analysis is, therefore, to provide an indication
about the prevailing character of inward FDI. Subsequently, policy recommendations related to
promoting FDI inflows into the Czech Republic in the future will be formulated at the very end of
this section.
3.1 Preliminary Data Analysis and Formulation of Basic Hypotheses
The development of FDI inflows will be examined in terms of logarithms of quarterly inflow of
FDI at constant (1995) prices using the deflator of gross fixed capital formation
(FDI_CP_FLOW). The reason for using this particular variable is to extract information about
factors that initiate changes in real capital inflows that result in a transfer of physical capital stock
and related technology.
 9, 10
As mentioned above, there are several theoretically relevant factors affecting the behaviour of
FDI. In our case, we use the following variables to explain the inflow of FDI into the Czech
Republic in the last decade:
•  Nominal unit labour costs (ULC), expressed in euro, to capture the influence of the wage
competitiveness of the Czech economy from a foreign investor’s point of view. This variable
allows for labour productivity effects based on Czech GDP at constant (1995) prices versus
the number of employed people. The expected effect is negative. A statistically significant
negative effect of ULC on inward FDI could indicate that FDI incoming into the Czech
Republic has been prevailingly of the vertical pattern.
11
•  The current account deficit at constant (1995) prices (CA_CP) as a measure of the
vulnerability of the economy in terms of real external disequilibrium. The expected effect is
negative due to the assumption that foreign investors are aware of the riskiness of the recipient
country, which is expressed using this variable in our case.
•  Real GDP in twelve EU countries (EU_GDP_CP).
12 This series should serve as an indicator
of the economic climate in the area from which the bulk of inward FDI flows into the Czech
Republic. Consequently, it potentially gives an indication of the willingness of European
MNCs to invest abroad. It is commonly accepted that in the case of vertical FDI a substantial
part of the production from foreign affiliates is intended to be re-exported to FDI home
countries. Hence the actual domestic economic climate and business cycle development in
                                          
9 There is not much reliable information about the structure of FDI inflow in particular years or even quarters in
terms of discriminating privatisations, joint ventures, brownfield and greenfield projects, etc. That is why
privatisation revenues cannot easily be deducted from the total inflow of FDI and inward FDI has to be modelled
as whole.
10 The key statistical data related to inward FDI in the Czech Republic in the last decade are shown for
illustration in Appendix 1.
11 Actually, we should consider the competitiveness of the Czech economy against similar countries based on its
relative change with respect to unit labour costs in competitor countries. However, the influence of the relative
unit labour costs of the Czech economy compared to nine countries (Chile, Ireland, Netherlands, Taiwan, Spain,
Hungary, Poland, etc.) turned out to be statistically insignificant. Moreover, there was an intention to conduct the
empirical examination purely in a time-dimension line, without considering cross-country links.
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those countries can play a crucial role in an MNC’s decisions relating to the timing of its
vertical FDI activities. A positive impact would indicate a vertical pattern of inward FDI in
the Czech Republic.
13
•  The share of CzechInvest projects (expressed as a three-quarter moving average) in the total
FDI inflow (SH_PROJ_FDI_L). This should serve as a proxy for lasting government effort to
offer investment incentives and to assist foreign investors when settling in the Czech Republic
via this special agency (see Appendix 2). This variable is led by three quarters for further
econometric exploration in order to capture the relation under special circumstances. There is
approximately a three-quarter time lag between the announcement of a particular CzechInvest
project and the real financial flow captured in the balance of payments. The expected impact
is positive.
14
•  Lagged FDI inflow approximating the existing FDI stock in order to allow for
“agglomeration” or “clustering” effects (FDI_CP_FLOW(-1)). The expected impact is
positive.
•  Real GDP in the Czech Republic (CR_GDP_CP) in order to catch the effects of the possible
influence of the market size of the Czech Republic and thus reveal the prevailing pattern of
the inward FDI in the Czech Republic. A significant positive impact would indicate a
horizontal pattern of incoming FDI in our country.
•  The share of general government expenditure in GDP (GEN_GOV_EXP). The outlays
include central and local government expenditure, pension and social security entitlements,
investment expenditure, all extrabudgetary expenditure, and loan repayments. This variable
should approximate the government’s intention to attract FDI into the country by means of
improving infrastructure, increasing payments into the social system in order to maintain
social cohesion, and providing the economy with efficient public governance and an
institutional and regulatory framework. We can expect a positive impact of this variable.
The Dickey–Fuller unit root test indicates that FDI_CP_FLOW is integrated of order one (I(1))
(see Table 1 for detailed results). In this case we have two possible ways of dealing with such a
series; either to transform it to make it stationary (e.g. by means of differencing), or to employ
cointegration analysis and to estimate a cointegration relation (cointegrating vector). The latter
possibility is more appropriate if there is an assumption of a long-run equilibrium relationship
between FDI_CP_FLOW and the explanatory variables discussed above. This assumption means
that if several variables are cointegrated, they must obey an equilibrium relation in the long run
                                          
13 From the theoretical point of view, however, the opposite impact is also possible. MNCs might shift
production to countries like the Czech Republic during a period of slower growth in the EU in order to lower
costs of production or expecting higher growth of the other regions in the medium term (in the case of horizontal
FDI).
14 “Government effort” covers a broad range of investment incentives and promotion activities, most of which
are not easily expressible in a statistical way. SH_PROJ_FDI_L is one of the few variables suitable and available
for econometric analyses. However, we are aware that there could be some caveats regarding its use in the
cointegration relationship below. As shown in Appendix 2, according to a survey evaluating the investment
climate and the satisfaction of foreign companies in the Czech Republic, foreign investors consider the existence
of government investment incentives and promotion to be the second most important factor of attractiveness of
the Czech Republic. However, this finding may suffer from sample-selectivity bias.12   Petr Král
although they may diverge substantially from this equilibrium in the short run. [Davidson,
MacKinnon, 1993].
To test for cointegration, we first verify that all the above-mentioned variables that we expect to
be cointegrated with FDI_CP_FLOW are each individually I(1).
15, 16
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In the cases of ULC, EU_GDP_CP and CR_GDP_CP we anticipate that the average pace of their
growth is positive, i.e. these are unit root processes with a positive drift. As seen in Table 1, all
                                          
15 All the variables below including FDI_CP_FLOW are logarithms of quarterly values of a particular factor.
16 See Figure 1 for an overview of the development of these series as such over time.Identification and Measurement of Relationships Concerning Inflow of FDI   13
the variables are I(1) and in all cases the ADF could not reject the hypothesis of a unit root (non-
stationarity). All the first differences of these variables are already stationary, i.e. I(0) processes.
17
Table 1: Results of Unit Root Testing (ADF)
series ADF test stat.  5% critical value ADF test stat.  5% critical value
FDI_CP_FLOW 0.3137 -1.9510 -9.4636 -1.9514
ULC -0.3340 -2.9627 -4.8239 -2.9665
CA_CP -1.2065 -1.9514 -7.2074 -1.9517
EU_GDP_CP -1.0123 -2.9399 -3.6574 -2.9422
SH_PROJ_FDI_L -1.7421 -1.9501 -9.0125 -1.9504
CR_GDP_CP -1.9293 -2.9499 -6.1193 -2.9527
GEN_GOV_EXP -0.6444 -1.9526 -7.2838 -1.9530
actual series 1st differences
There are many techniques in the econometric literature describing how to deal with integrated
series, to test cointegration, or to construct and estimate error-correction models (ECMs) – see, for
example, [Hamilton, 1994]. Based on this, vector autoregression models (VAR models) and the
Engle–Granger approach are considered to be the two most appealing methods for our purposes.
The advantages of vector modelling using the theory of VAR models over the Engle–Granger
approach are straightforward. Namely, VAR structures enable complex identification and
estimation of cointegration relations among interdependent variables.
Compared with the multivariate modelling strategy, the univariate approach has its limitations.
This method, based on the Engle–Granger cointegration test, supposes and identifies only one
cointegration relation among the set of variables. Moreover, the simplicity of the univariate model
could be insufficient for describing all the statistically significant relationships.
Therefore, in our econometric exercise below we rely on the VAR methodology. Given the very
short time series available for the analysis, however, the results were also derived by relying on
the Engle–Granger approach.
As will be shown below, due to weak exogeneity the VAR model can be reduced to a single-
equation model. Moreover, the final model obtained from the VAR will be quite similar to that
derived from the univariate approach. This comparison supports the robustness of the presented
results, including their interpretation and conclusions.
                                          
17 Despite the results of the ADF test, there may be some caveats as regards our assumption of non-stationarity
of some of the variables tested above reflecting the theoretical point of view relevant in the long run. For
example, FDI_CP_FLOW and CA_CP should behave as I(0) variables in the sufficiently long run based on the
theory. However, we do not have a sufficiently long time series at our disposal to prove the validity of this
theoretically based assumption, so we cannot ignore the results of the ADF test when building the econometric
model below. The author can provide more details about the testing of the stationarity of the selected variables
on request.14   Petr Král
3.2 Empirical Examination
3.2.1 Estimation of a Cointegrating Vector
In order to identify a cointegration relation among the variables mentioned in the previous
subsection, we employ the Johansen cointegration test. This test is based and dependent on the
entire structure of the VEC system estimated without any reduction of parameters.
18 Brief results
of its application on the above-listed time series are shown in the next two tables.
19
Table 2: Results of the Johansen Cointegration Test
Sample: 1995:1 2002:3 Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Value Critical Value No. of CE(s)
0.690543 75.77532 68.52 76.07       None *
0.588868 41.76014 47.21 54.46    At most 1
0.302004 15.98378 29.68 35.65    At most 2
0.168667 5.557056 15.41 20.04    At most 3
0.006874 0.200044 3.76 6.65    At most 4
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level
 L.R. test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% significance level
The results of the test indicate that one statistically significant cointegrating vector is identified






Consequently, the normalised cointegration vector is of the following form:
Table 3: The Normalized Cointegration Vector
Variable FDI_CP_FLOW ULC CA_CP SH_PROJ_FDI_L EU_GDP_CP C
Norm. coint. coefficient 1.00000 0.03181 0.32025 0.83660 -19.07937 138.11560
Std. error 1.59368 0.09127 0.34287 4.75960
                                          
18 Cointegration analysis and error-correction models for modelling foreign direct investment in the Czech
Republic were employed among others in [Mandel, Tomšík, 2001]. The authors identified a cointegration vector
for FDI inflow and estimated an error-correction model using the Engle–Granger approach. They used
real/nominal short-term interbank interest rates, the rate of unemployment in the Czech Republic and Czech real
GDP as variables connected to FDI in both the long and short run. However, their estimation was done with a
different research objective and using a different specification. That is why we do not want to compare the
results of our econometric exploration with their findings.
19 The test allows for intercept (no trend) in the cointegration equation and intercept in restricted VAR. There are
no exogenous variables in VAR included, and a one-quarter lag in VAR has been imposed. A one-quarter lag in
VAR has been identified as optimal using the Akaike information criteria and the LR test.Identification and Measurement of Relationships Concerning Inflow of FDI   15
We can see in Table 3 that the parameters of the cointegrating vector serving as long-run
multipliers all have the right signs except SH_PROJ_FDI_L. All the variables except ULC are
statistically significant.
It would be possible to continue the vector approach and to build and estimate an error-correction
model based on the entire VEC specification using the estimated cointegration relation in Table 3.
However, the available data series are not long enough to obtain stable and robust estimation
results when applying this procedure completely.
Thus, in order to switch to the univariate approach when building the ECM, the parameters of the
cointegrating vector (in Table 3) within the VEC structure need to be re-estimated and the
assumption of weak exogeneity of all the variables (except FDI_CP_FLOW) needs to be tested.
Hence, we jointly test the weak exogeneity assumption in the restricted VAR model. In other
words, we verify whether any of the loading parameters are equal to zero in particular equations
of the VEC system. This would mean that the error-correction term is statistically insignificant in
particular equations of the dynamic short-run relationship. If the group of variables is weakly
exogenous, then the reduction of the VAR model to the univariate approach does not lead to a loss
of information carried by the data and no substantial distortion is made when estimating the
univariate error-correction model. This would be favourable from the economic point of view,
since it could give stronger guidance for interpretation of the results.
As is obvious from the results in Table 4, the test does not reject a weak joint exogeneity in the
case of ULC, CA_CP, SH_PROJ_FDI_L, and EU_GDP_CP at the 10% significance level.
20 The
LR test of restrictions suggests that there is no substantial loss of information by imposing a
restriction on the loading parameters (coefficients Alpha in Table 4) to be equal to zero for all
dynamic equations except the equation of short-run dynamics of FDI_CP_FLOW. Hence, we can
consider this group of variables to be weakly jointly exogenous.
Table 4: Results of the Weak Joint Exogeneity Test
Series Beta Standard errors of beta t - Statistic Alpha Standard errors of alpha
FDI_CP_FLOW      1.00000 0.00000 -1.04690 0.17230
ULC                 2.21480 1.26630 1.74903 0.00000 0.00000
SH_PROJ_FDI_L   -0.37964 0.10237 -3.70851 0.00000 0.00000
EU_GDP_CP          -16.10800 4.31740 -3.73095 0.00000 0.00000
CA_CP                0.25054 0.06755 3.70901 0.00000 0.00000
LR test of restrictions: Chi^2(4) =   7.1763 [0.1269]  
Simultaneously, we obtain parameter values of the cointegration relationship, termed “long-run
multipliers”, that are compatible with the above-mentioned restriction imposed on the system
                                          
20 The test allows for no explicit intercept in the cointegrating equation. There are no exogenous variables in
VAR included and a one-quarter lag in VAR is imposed.16   Petr Král
(shown in the second column Beta in Table 4). The corresponding standard errors imply that they
are all statistically significant and have the expected sign supposed by the underlying theory.
21
Now we can compare the estimated cointegrating vector arising from the vector approach based
on a VEC model (see Table 4) with the results of the univariate approach based on a single OLS
regression model – the Engle–Granger method. A brief comparison of the estimated parameters of
the cointegration equations is shown in Table 5.
Table 5: Comparison of Both Methods of Estimating Cointegration
Variable
E-G OLS  VEC with restriction E-G OLS  VEC with restriction
C -126.0997 - -2.88682 -
ULC -2.17422 -2.21480 -1.57809 -1.74903
CA_CP -0.16536 -0.25054 -2.10478 -3.70901
EU_GDP_CP 16.43839 16.10800 3.37240 3.73095
SH_PROJ_FDI_L 0.37337 0.37964 3.13827 3.70851
Estimated parametres of CE t-statistic of estimated parametres
As can be seen in Table 5, the values of the parameters of the cointegrating vector estimated by
means of the VEC restricted structure and their statistical significance are very similar to those
obtained within the univariate Engle–Granger procedure.
The similarity of both cointegrating vectors obtained by the two different approaches suggests the
robustness of the existence of a cointegration relationship among the above-mentioned variables.
These encouraging results give justification for further econometric investigation in terms of
estimating a univariate error-correction model, included in the next section.
3.2.2 Building and Estimating a Univariate Error-Correction Model
The results of the Johansen test and the test of weak exogeneity justify reduction of the vector
approach into univariate modelling, namely into an estimation of a univariate error-correction
model.
The ECM model is intended to describe the short-term dynamics of FDI inflows in the Czech
Republic in the last decade. Error-correction models represent an alternative approach to
dealing with integrated variables besides the standard approach which leads to differencing
the series as many times as needed to transform them into stationary series [Davidson,
MacKinnon, 1993]. This type of model explains the immediate short-term changes in
dependent variables by means of deviations from a particular equilibrium relationship
between these dependent variables and the explanatory variables. These deviations are often
called error-correction terms.
                                          
21 With respect to footnote 14, we try to re-estimate the cointegration relation without the presence of
SH_PROJ_FDI_L. Nonetheless, it turns out that the new cointegration relation is statistically insignificant.Identification and Measurement of Relationships Concerning Inflow of FDI   17
So now we use deviations from the cointegration relation estimated in the previous section as the
error-correction term when building the ECM. The results of estimation of the ECM exploiting
this error-correction term are shown in Table 6.
Table 6: The Error-Correction Model
Dependent Variable: DIF_FDI_CP_FLOW
Sample(adjusted): 1996:2 2002:3
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -112.4486 20.0266 -5.6149 0.0000
DIF_ULC -6.3416 2.0691 -3.0648 0.0061
ECT_VEC(-1) -0.9130 0.1623 -5.6259 0.0000
DIF_SH_PR_FDI_L 0.3852 0.0817 4.7122 0.0001
DIF_GEN_GOV_EXP(-4) 5.1732 1.4007 3.6934 0.0014
SH_CA_GDP(-2) -0.1085 0.0599 -1.8126 0.0849
R-squared 0.819221     Durbin-Watson stat 2.467984
Adjusted R-squared 0.774027     S.D. dependent var 0.735709
S.E. of regression 0.349732    Akaike info criterion 0.935872
The variables are defined as follows:
•  C is a constant.
•  DIF_FDI_CP_FLOW denotes the first differences of FDI_CP_FLOW as the dependent
variable.
•  DIF_ULC stands for the first differences of ULC. We expect a negative effect of this factor
similar to that in the cointegration equation in line with the assumption of verticality of
incoming FDI.
•  ECT_VEC is the error-correction term from the VEC model structure and its coefficient
should be negative according to the theory of ECM.
•  DIF_SH_PR_FDI_L denotes the first differences of SH_PROJ_FDI_L with an expected
positive sign as in the long-run relationship.
•  DIF_GEN_GOV_EXP stands for the lagged differences of the share of general government
outlays (including central and local government expenditure, pension and social security
entitlements, investment expenditure, all extrabudgetary expenditure, and loan repayments) in
GDP. The expected sign of this variable is positive in line with what has been discussed
above.
•  SH_CA_GDP denotes the share of the current account deficit in GDP at current prices lagged
by two quarters to allow for the impact of external disequilibrium and the vulnerability of the
economy in the short run. Similarly to CA_CP in the cointegration equation, this factor should
affect the behaviour of inward FDI in a negative manner.
As during the estimation of the cointegration equation above, in this case we also try to include all
plausible variables to capture a variety of factors influencing the short-run dynamics of inward
FDI. Naturally, we attempt to employ the first differences of all the variables in the cointegration
equation when estimating the ECM and even several more variables suggested by the theory and18   Petr Král
empirical evidence from abroad. However, not all of them turn out to be statistically significant at
a reasonable level.
Thus, as we can see in Table 6, all the explanatory variables are statistically significant at the
10% significance level and all have the right sign. The lags of the explanatory variables are
chosen in order to optimise the explanatory power of the model and statistical significance of
the regressors. Simultaneously, the economic interpretation of such econometric results is
taken into account as well when changing the lag structure.
The coefficient standing by the error-correction term (known as the “loading parameter”) is
the most significant parameter, which indicates that the difference from the long-run
cointegration relation is a substantial factor determining the development of inward FDI in the
near-term horizon.
22 The explanatory power of the estimated error-correction model is quite
remarkable.
The in-sample fits of the above-estimated model in terms of both differences of the real FDI
inflow and the real FDI inflow as such are depicted in Figure 2.
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3.3 Summary and Interpretation of the Empirical Analysis Results
We conclude that we have succeeded in estimating a statistically significant long-run
cointegrating relationship between real FDI inflow on the one hand and the following factors on
the other hand:
•  the evolution of unit labour costs in terms of foreign currency, reflecting changes in the
international competitiveness of the Czech economy
•  the vulnerability of the economy, approximated by the current account deficit measured at
constant prices
•  economic performance in the main EU countries, and
                                          
22 The inverse value of the loading parameter can be interpreted as the length of time needed for return to
equilibrium. Value of 1.1 quarters indicates quite a high speed of adjustment, which seems relatively unrealistic.
This fact is probably affected by the structure of the data set and the short time series.Identification and Measurement of Relationships Concerning Inflow of FDI   19
•  the share of CzechInvest projects in total FDI inflow, approximating the lasting intention of
the Czech government to provide foreign investors with investment incentives and
promotion.
23
Simultaneously, the results suggest that the privatisation process and sales of state-owned
property by the government do not seem to be an important factor of inward FDI in the long run.
The reason probably lies in the fact that privatisation is generally considered to be a temporary
process related to the transition of the economy and investors would prefer countries providing a
stable economic environment in the long run. However, in the Czech case the privatisation sales
are not statistically significant in the short run either.
Similarly, the GDP of the Czech economy does not turn out to be a statistically significant factor
either in the long-run cointegration relation or in the short-run dynamics. That could be a
consequence of two possible reasons, namely:
•  Actual economic development is not of a great relevance to investors, since they focus on the
long-run growth and market size prospects potentially arising from the Czech Republic’s
future accession to the EU. The particular evolution of the business cycle in the Czech
economy does not influence investors’ strategic decisions regarding the time horizon of five
or ten years.
•  Inward FDI in the Czech Republic is not primarily oriented on the local market (which would
be the case with vertical FDI rather than horizontal FDI). FDI inflows are independent of the
prosperity and size of the Czech economy (measured by real GDP). The reason for such
behaviour by investors might be the heavy export orientation of their investment projects in
the Czech Republic. The motivation of these investors might be to benefit from the
comparative advantage offered by the Czech Republic in terms of cheap labour, government
investment incentives and advantageous geographical location. The validity of this
explanation could be supported by the statistical significance of unit labour costs and the share
of CzechInvest projects in total FDI in both the long-run and short-run relations describing the
behaviour of inward FDI. Moreover, the statistical significance of real GDP in the twelve EU
countries in the cointegrating vector also suggests that inward FDI coming to the Czech
Republic has been prevailingly of a vertical character.
The empirical analysis does not identify a statistical significance of the lagged dependent variable
included in the error-correction model. This means a rejection of the hypothesis that the short-run
dynamics of inward FDI are influenced by the previous development of FDI influx by means of
the “agglomeration” or “clustering effect”. Or alternatively, the lagged FDI inflow is not a good
proxy for the clustering effect.
                                          
23 CzechInvest projects include greenfield projects, brownfield projects, joint ventures, technical co-operation
and expansions in manufacturing, and strategic services and technological centres as the new knowledge-based
industries. Since 1998, the assistance of CzechInvest has meant simultaneously the possibility of receiving
government investment incentives and promotion (see Appendix 2). On the other hand, privatisations and private
M&As are realised without any assistance from CzechInvest.20   Petr Král
The almost accounting relationship between FDI inflow and reinvested earnings on the basis of
the balance of payments does not turn out to be of statistical significance due to the general
pattern of inward FDI in the Czech Republic in recent years.
24
It is likely that the government can influence inflow of FDI in both the long and short run by
introducing and maintaining a competitive scheme of government investment incentives and
promotion. This finding is confirmed by the fact that GIIP has become a very substantial element
in competition among countries fighting for inward FDI in the last decade, as suggested by the
foreign empirical evidence.
Based on the results of the error-correction model, the government can accelerate the FDI inflow
in the short run by increasing public expenditure on infrastructure, efficient public governance, a
functioning legal and regulatory framework for the economy, and a flexible social system.
The results presented imply that sustainability of external equilibrium and the threat of deep
indebtedness in terms of foreign capital might have played an important role in the decision-
making of foreign investors in choosing to locate their foreign affiliates in the Czech Republic.
The underlying explanation of the specific influence on FDI is obvious. It is commonly accepted
that trouble-free transfer of profits is generally one of the most important requirements
emphasised by foreign investors when investing abroad. Simultaneously, there is a notion that
current account disequilibrium can endanger the ability of an economy to generate sufficient
foreign currency liquidity to enable the desired smooth transfer of profits from FDI in the
economy back to home countries. Therefore, it is noteworthy that based on the analysis this factor




The ultimate goal of the project was to obtain quantitative evidence and an econometric
estimation describing the determinants of FDI in the case of the Czech economy. In order to do
that, the paper explores the theoretical background and foreign empirical evidence regarding
possible factors determining the behaviour of inward FDI.
We can conclude that the final empirical results concerning the relevant determinants of the FDI
inflow into the Czech Republic correspond to a certain extent to the theoretically considered and
                                          
24 In this context, there is a discussion on the possible negative effects of MNCs’ profits on the current account
and balance of payments and foreign exchange liquidity as a whole. If the profits are reinvested in the form of
FDI, then they constitute no effective foreign exchange demand because they improve the financial account at
the same time. It is obvious, however, that the decision on FDI in the form of reinvested earnings is subject to
the same criteria in an MNC as in the case of direct FDI influx from abroad. Moreover, in the case of the Czech
Republic, the growing FDI inflow is probably associated with an improvement on the current account through an
enhanced export capacity of the domestic economy.
25 [Benáček, 2000] presents results of several selected studies concerning FDI behaviour in Czech industrial
enterprises in the 1990s. The author concludes that foreign investors were initially only rarely motivated to base
their ventures on the endowments of local human capital. Their motive was to take advantage of the availability
of cheap labour. This is in line with our results in this study.Identification and Measurement of Relationships Concerning Inflow of FDI   21
empirically tested factors. Simultaneously, there is an indication based on the empirical results
that inward FDI in recent years has been prevailingly of a vertical character in the Czech
Republic. In other words, foreign investors have focused on the comparative (dis)advantage of the
Czech economy in terms of input prices, government promotion of FDI and economic
vulnerability.
Thus, the estimated econometric model and the interpretation of its results provide some guidance
for evaluating the role that the particular factors considered may have played in affecting FDI
inflow in the past. These results also indicate that there is an important role for the government in
attracting FDI inflows into the Czech Republic. Hence, the results presented in the paper can
serve as a basis for formulating policy recommendations as well.
More specifically, the empirical results suggest that if the Czech government intends to accelerate
FDI inflow then it should attempt to establish and maintain overall macroeconomic stability and
external equilibrium. In a small open economy framework with a close relationship between
internal and external disequilibrium, this intention means maintaining a stable internal economic
environment in particular.
A consistent and competitive package of government investment incentives and promotion is
another measure promoting inward FDI. Although GIIP are not a market based instrument of
economic policy, their high and growing importance for the decision-making of multinational
companies on the location of their foreign affiliates is confirmed by empirical studies and
overviews from abroad as well.
Finally, a high-quality infrastructure, well-functioning public governance, an efficient legal and
regulatory framework for the economy, and social cohesion supported by a flexible social system
are also necessary preconditions for any economy to successfully compete for inward FDI.
The insufficient length and structure of economic time series and structural changes related to the
transition process considerably complicate the empirical analysis of FDI inflows in the Czech
Republic. Therefore, we consider the results of the empirical analysis and econometric estimation
as preliminary and indicative. Accordingly, at this stage the estimated model is probably not an
appropriate tool for forecasting purposes.22   Petr Král
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Appendix 1
Basic Data on FDI in the Czech Republic
1. Development of Inward FDI in Terms of Flow and Stock During the Last Decade
Source:  Balance of payments of the Czech Republic in 2002 Q4,
http://wdb.cnb.cz/cnbeng/cnbeng.wwv_main.main?p_language=us&p_cornerid=1822,and
International investment position of the Czech Republic in 2002 Q4,
http://wdb.cnb.cz/cnbeng/cnbeng.wwv_main.main?p_language=us&p_cornerid=1904&p_full=1
2. Comparison of the Czech Republic with Several Other CEE Countries as Regards
Inward FDI
in USD
year Czech Rep.  Hungary Poland Slovakia Czech Rep.  Hungary Poland Slovakia Czech Rep.  Hungary Poland Slovakia
1990 NA NA NA NA NA 53.3 NA NA NA NA 2.3 NA
1991 NA 141.2 7.6 NA NA 205.7 NA NA NA 141.2 9.9 NA
1992 NA 142.9 17.7 NA 280.1 351.8 NA NA NA 284.3 27.6 NA
1993 63.2 227.4 44.7 NA 331.5 591.4 NA NA 63.2 512.2 72.3 37.4
1994 85.0 111.0 48.8 50.5 440.1 723.6 98.6 167.8 148.2 624.1 121.0 87.7
1995 248.7 438.8 95.2 44.0 711.9 1 284.4 204.1 241.9 397.0 1 063.9 216.1 131.5
1996 139.1 221.3 117.1 65.3 831.2 1 574.1 298.5 380.7 536.6 1 287.6 333.4 196.5
1997 124.9 211.5 127.7 32.3 896.4 1 708.8 379.7 386.9 662.1 1 502.7 461.0 228.5
1998 359.4 199.5 165.7 104.2 1 396.9 1 852.4 585.3 535.9 1 022.3 1 707.2 627.0 332.3
1999 614.0 194.3 189.4 65.5 1 707.2 2 019.1 679.5 590.3 1 637.3 1 907.6 816.9 397.4
2000 485.4 162.4 243.6 379.4 2 107.0 1 968.6 892.4 877.6 2 124.1 2 076.8 1 060.9 776.3
2001 481.7 241.3 149.1 272.5 2 618.7 2 202.0 1 076.3 1 027.6 2 616.5 2 324.1 1 210.8 1 047.7
2002 822.3 85.3 141.0 737.5 3 306.2 2 636.2 1 250.4 1 150.8 3 429.1 2 418.1 1 352.3 1 783.4
FDI inflow per capita FDI stock per capita cumulative FDI inflow per capita
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3. Foreign Direct Investment in the Czech Republic by Industry – Shares on Cumulative
FDI Inflow During 1993 – 2002
Source: http://www.cnb.cz/en/stat_pb_pzi.php
4. Foreign Direct Investment in the Czech Republic by Country – Shares on Cumulative
FDI Inflow During 1993 - 2002
Source: http://www.cnb.cz/en/stat_pb_pzi.php
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32%26   Petr Král
5. Penetration of FDI-Related Enterprises into Entrepreneurial Sector – Share of
Enterprises under Foreign Control on Value Added and Gross Fixed Capital
Formation
26
Source: ČSÚ (2002), http://www.czso.cz/csu/edicniplan.nsf/p/5103-02
                                          
26 In the context of growing share of enterprises under foreign control on economic activities in the Czech
Republic in recent years, a phenomenon of so called “dual economy” is being mentioned very often. There is a
discussion whether there are some technological spillovers between foreign firms and local enterprises or
whether a mere „batting average effect“ causes the accelerating productivity growth of the Czech business
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Appendix 2
Government Investment Incentives in the Czech Republic
The turning point in the development of FDI inflow in 1998 is often considered to be a
consequence (among others) of the implementation of an explicit government investment
incentives and promotion (GIIP) scheme in the Czech Republic. Surprisingly, it competed for FDI
during 1990–1997 without a proper GIIP regime.
27 As a result, the Czech Republic was not very
successful in attracting FDI and did not experience much positive structural and technological
change following the FDI inflow such as in the case of Hungary in those years.
In 1998 the environment began to change. At first government decrees, and since 2000 the Act on
Investment Incentives, have established a regime within which a relatively consistent, transparent
and competitive set of GIIP is granted to both foreign and domestic investors. Currently,
according to the valid Act, the scheme for the manufacturing sector consists of:
•  Tax incentives (up to 10-year tax relief) for greenfield and brownfield projects over USD 10
million (USD 5 million in areas with extraordinarily high rates of unemployment) in
manufacturing (high-tech products or facilities) with environment-friendly building and
operating capacities.
•  Job creation grants – financial support for creation of new jobs for companies fulfilling the
same criteria as for the tax incentive. The size of job creation grants depends on the level of
unemployment in the district where the investment is made. It ranges from zero in areas with
unemployment below the national average to a maximum of USD 5,300 per employee in
districts with unemployment more than 50% higher than the average.
•  Retraining grants – financial support for retraining new employees ranges from zero to a
maximum of 35% of total training costs depending on the same criteria as in the case of job
creation grants.
•  Site support (within the Programme of support of industrial zones development) – provision
of low-cost building, land and/or infrastructure. The incentive is granted to the municipality
and/or the private developer in the form of subsidies provided for the development of site
infrastructure and the transfer of land from state ownership to the municipality at an
advantageous price.
(see [http://www.czechinvest.cz/ci/ci_an.nsf/Publikace?OpenPage])
Regarding investment incentives for strategic services and technology centres, a government
decree introduced two new framework programmes, namely the Framework Programme for
                                          
27 The only substantial promotion measure was that “since July 1993 joint venture companies in the Czech
Republic with a minimum 30% foreign ownership (but no less than $1,47 mil) have been allowed a one-year
exemption from customs duties on raw materials or semi-processed goods imported through a foreign partner for
further manufacturing in the Czech Republic” [Zemplinerová, Benáček, 1997, p. 6]. This piece of support was
abolished at the end of 1996.28   Petr Král
Support Strategic Services Projects and Framework Programme for Support of Establishment and
Expansion of Technology Centres. The most important government incentives in these areas are:
•  Subsidies for business activity, covering up to 50% of eligible business expenses (i.e. wage
costs during the first two years or capital expenditure on buildings, machinery and equipment,
including expenditure on intangible assets of up to 25% of the costs).
•  Subsidies for training and re-training, covering up to 35% of special training costs per
employee and up to 60% of general training costs per employee (general training refers to
providing general knowledge and skills that can also be used outside the investor’s project;
special training refers to training by which employees gain knowledge that can be used only
within the investor’s project and cannot easily be transferred to other employers.
(see [http://www.czechinvest.cz/ci/ci_an.nsf/Publikace?OpenPage]):
28
Besides the above-mentioned support, there are several additional measures designed to attract
FDI into the Czech Republic and to promote investment generally. These are not included in the
Act but they are included in special government decrees and in other central and local government
and municipality programmes:
29
•  import duty exemptions for import of technology;
•  regional support for investment in districts with the greatest structural problems;
•  support from regional labour offices (branches of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs)
based on subsidies for newly created jobs for previously unemployed people;
•  support for small and medium-sized enterprises by means of advantageous loans provided by
the state-owned Czech-Moravian Guarantee and Development Bank (Českomoravská záruční
a rozvojová banka);
•  a programme of support for Czech subcontractors.
30
The Ministry of Industry and Trade established a state agency named CzechInvest in 1992 to
attract foreign investors and to help them in founding new affiliates in the Czech Republic. The
GIIP for foreign investors is conducted solely through CzechInvest, and projects processed by
CzechInvest have become a substantial part of the total FDI inflow. Specifically, CzechInvest
projects accounted on average for approximately 20% of the total annual FDI inflow in the last
decade. The share of these projects in the total annual flow of inward FDI has reached around 30–
                                          
28 There is a very detailed specification of what is to be classified as “Strategic service” and “Technology
Centres”, as well as strictly defined eligibility criteria for investors to gain those incentives (see
[http://www.czechinvest.cz/ci/ci_an.nsf/Publikace?OpenPage]).
29 Since investment incentives are a form of public subsidy, the whole system of incentives is designed to be
compatible with EU regulations. In particular, applications for investment incentives must pass an evaluation by
the Office for the Protection of Economic Competition (Anti-Monopoly Office), whose procedures define an
exemption to the ban on providing public subsidies. The Anti-Monopoly Office decides on the total value of
state aid (investment incentives) available to each investor (investment project).
30 There is a question as to whether a scheme of investment incentives and promotion designed in such a way
induces a sufficient volume of the positive externalities and technological spillovers that may generally follow
FDI inflow. The existing system is definitely not ideal from this point of view, but an examination of this issue
goes beyond the objective of this paper.Identification and Measurement of Relationships Concerning Inflow of FDI   29
40% recently. Approximately 75% of CzechInvest projects have been granted a government
investment incentive. It is widely accepted that CzechInvest has been operating successfully in
attracting FDI into the Czech Republic.
31
Every two years CzechInvest commissions a survey to evaluate the investment climate and the
satisfaction of foreign companies in the Czech Republic. According to investors, the main reasons
for inward FDI in the Czech Republic seem to be [Jahn, Zigic, 2001]:
•  its cheap labour force (an advantageous ratio of wages/salaries to labour productivity) and
long-standing and deep-rooted industrial and technical tradition,
•  the existence of a government investment incentives and promotion scheme,
•  its advantageous geographical location,
•  a low participation rate in, and low power of, trade unionism.
The main disadvantages of the Czech economy from the foreign investor’s point of view
according to the survey are [Jahn, Zigic, 2001]:
•  bureaucracy and officialdom,
•  a bad transport infrastructure (a non-existent compact network of motorways),
•  the low capacity of frontier offices and customs authorities,
•  administrative hurdles and barriers,
•  a poor educational system and its lack of orientation towards the needs of the production
sector (especially manufacturing),
•  a generous social system that does not motivate people to look for jobs and to start working.
In the next table we can see the development of CzechInvest’s activities over the last decade in
terms of project volumes in US dollars and newly created jobs.
Table 1: The Development of CzechInvest’s Activities
year in mil. of USD newly created jobs in mil. of USD newly created jobs
1993 12.5 570 0.0 0
1994 71.0 1392 0.0 0
1995 81.9 1323 0.0 0
1996 191.2 1995 0.0 0
1997 338.1 2137 0.0 0
1998 732.5 4142 692.1 1609
1999 910.4 7067 524.7 4550
2000 1561.3 18358 1333.6 7838
2001 2174.5 14412 1327.7 13211
 2002p 1032.2 11767 1145.6 8220
Total CzechInvest projects CzechInvest projects granted by GIIP
Source: http://www.czechinvest.cz/ci/ci_cz.nsf/(ReasonsToInvestWD)/Vysledky?OpenDocument
http://www.czechinvest.cz/ci/ci_cz.nsf/(InvestmentIncentivesWD)/Introduction?OpenDocument
                                          
31 CzechInvest was awarded first place in the competition “Investment Promoting Agency of the Year Europe” in
2001 organised by the journal Corporate Location. Similarly prestigious “Best European IPA Awards” were
conferred on CzechInvest by the jury of Strategic Direct Investor (a magazine for foreign direct investors) in
2003.30   Petr Král
There was a gradual but remarkable increase in the volume of total CzechInvest projects and the
number of newly created jobs during 1993–1997. The following period
(1998–2000) was characterised by a sharp jump in both these figures. It seems that since 2001–
2002 this very fast growth has reverted to stable development or even a slight decline in these
quantitative dimensions of CzechInvest’s activities.
Regarding the development of CzechInvest projects granted government investment incentives,
they peaked in 2000 and 2001 – similarly to total projects – and are currently declining
moderately.
32
                                          
32 There are possibly several cases in the overview of CzechInvest’s projects where there is a time lag between
the announcement of a firm’s intention to invest in the Czech Republic with the assistance of CzechInvest and
the firm’s request for a government investment incentive for that project. Consequently, a single project can be
captured in two different years. Accordingly, the category projects granted GIIP does not always have to be less
than the overall category total CzechInvest projects in terms of both project volume and newly created jobs, even
though generally projects granted GIIP are a sub-aggregate of total projects announced. For the econometric
procedures undertaken in the paper, only the category of total CzechInvest projects based on the date of
announcement of a particular project will be used, and the above-mentioned time dissonance will not matter.CNB Working Papers Series
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